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β t
s
max RP
strat20 [[0.1,0.3]
0.01,[4,6]
0.1] 65 ﬁxed
strat100 [[0.1,1]
0.01,[1,10]
0.1] 65 ﬁxed
bdl [[0.1,1]
0.01,[1,10]
0.1] [30,100] ﬁxed
all [[0.1,1]
0.01,[1,10]
0.1] [30,100] normal
Table 1: Variable initialisation when learning the
kernel density estimates.
next step is to verify that the KDE-method can indeed give a
prediction that is suﬃciently accurate to use in the trade-oﬀ
algorithm. Thus, instead of the real weights with a random
perturbation, we now use the prediction of the opponent’s
weights under diﬀerent levels of knowledge (which are repre-
sented by diﬀerent kernel density estimates). The key diﬀe-
rence between these estimates is the information about the
opponent that is known to the agent. Since the opponent’s
bidding strategy is inﬂuenced by the deadline of the nego-
tiation, t
a
max, the reservation prices, RP, and the strategy
parameter β (as can be seen in equation 3), these are the
parameters varied in the diﬀerent scenarios presented below.
By this means we analyse the eﬀect of the amount of know-
ledge, and therefore the precision of the prediction, on the
eﬃciency of the trade-oﬀ algorithm.
It is our belief that the parameter which will be most dif-
ﬁcult to obtain information about in our domain is the stra-
tegy parameter. It is hard to deduce from past experiences
and may change for each individual encounter. Therefore,
we start in the scenarios strat20 and strat100 with the stra-
tegy as a private parameter and the reservation price and
the deadline as public information. In this case, a KDE is
used which has learnt from opponents with varying βs, cho-
sen uniformly out of the domain. The diﬀerence between
the two is that the size of this domain for strat100 is much
bigger (two times one hundred possible values versus two
times twenty possible values with the same stepsize). This
means the buyer is much less sure about the opponent’s
strategy in strat100 than in strat20. In the next scenario
β-and-deadline, or bdl, again the strategy parameter is va-
ried, but now the deadlines are uncertain as well. This re-
ﬂects the fact that agents in e-commerce will have deadlines
which change over time, depending on the starting time of
the negotiation. Therefore, a probability distribution based
on past experiences may not be particularly useful and it
will be hard to get. Finally, in all, all the parameters are
uncertain. It should be noted however, that in all cases the
reservation prices are known to be in a normal distribution
(scaled to a lower rp of 10, an upper rp of 20, and a stan-
dard deviation of 1.5)
5. See Table 1 for the speciﬁc values
of all the scenarios. Note that the domains of the uniform
distributions are made discrete and the stepsize, if it is not
equal to one, is stated as a superscript.
Given this, the particular hypotheses we sought to eva-
luate here are as follows:
Hypothesis 3. Using kernel density estimates will re-
sult in a higher utility than not using any knowledge about
the opponent.
5This standard deviation is based on the price-distribution
of products often sold on the internet – like digital
cameras and laptops – on price comparison sites (e.g.
kelkoo: www.kelkoo.co.uk) and auction-sites (e.g. eBay:
www.ebay.co.uk).
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Counter−offer response 
Trade−off response 
Without KDE
x full rand no sim
A: us 0.206 0.278 0.217 0.047
B: us 0.309 0.830 0.714 0.750
With KDE
strat20 strat100 bdl all
A: us 0.249 0.205 0.237 0.201
B: us 0.830 0.799 0.804 0.802
Figure 3: The mean utility of the proposed trade-oﬀ
using diﬀerent knowledge levels.
Hypothesis 4. The more knowledge about the opponent
that is used in the kernel density estimation, the higher
the achieved utility will be.
The ﬁrst hypothesis captures the expectation that when
using KDE to predict the weights of the opponent, the per-
formance of the proposed trade-oﬀs will improve. If this were
true, it would justify the use of KDE as a learning method
that can be added to the trade-oﬀ algorithm. The second hy-
pothesis reﬂects the expectation that KDE should perform
better when there is more information about the opponent.
In particular, we expect the performance of the trade-oﬀ al-
gorithm to improve when the predictions are more precise,
and thus we expect a higher utility when the agent has more
a priori knowledge about its opponent.
The results are presented in ﬁgure 3. Since some of the
values lie close to each other, the results are also presented
in the accompanying table. As can be seen, especially in
environment A, all values are close to each other. This can
be explained by the fact that there are fewer contracts on
the iso-curve compared to environment B. Using an ANOVA
shows that the contract reached when using complete know-
ledge is signiﬁcantly better than the other contracts, while
the contract reached when not using similarity criteria per-
forms far worse than the rest. The analysis further shows
that strat20 and bdl perform better than strat100 and all
and the random strategy performs surprisingly well in this
environment (the results of the ANOVA show that there is
no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the random strategy and
the KDE-strategies). These results occur because the space
of improvements is small due to the comparatively small
number of points on the iso-curve, and, in turn, the error
when using incorrect information is smaller.